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Why Citizenship:
Where, When and How Children?
Ruth Lister*
This Article addresses the general question of "why citizenship?"
through the lens of children’s citizenship. It unpacks the different
elements of substantive citizenship and considers what they mean
for children: membership and participation; rights; responsibilities;
and equality of status, respect and recognition. It then discusses
the lessons that may be learned from feminist critiques of mainstream
constructions of citizenship, paying particular attention to the question
of capacity for citizenship. It concludes by suggesting that much of the
literature that is making the case for recognition of children as citizens
is not so much arguing for the wholesale extension of adult rights and
obligations of citizenship to children but recognition that children’s
citizenship practices constitute them as de facto, even if not complete
de jure, citizens. More broadly, the Article argues that this position
points towards an understanding of citizenship which embraces but
goes beyond that of a bundle of rights.
* Ruth Lister is Professor of Social Policy in the Department of Social Sciences,
Loughborough University, UK. She would like to thank the referees — Alexandra
Dobrowolsky and Guy Mundlak — together with Sharon Bessell and the student
editorial board for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft; and also
participants in the Why Citizenship? workshop, University of Toronto, May 26-28,
2006, for their feedback on the initial paper. A much shorter version of this article
will be published in CHILDREN AND CITIZENSHIP (Samantha Clutton et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2007).
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INTRODUCTION
"Why citizenship?" is the general question posed in this volume. This
Article addresses the question through the lens of children’s relationship to
citizenship. An argument running through the Article is that the language of
citizenship has a contribution to make over and above that of rights. This is
spelled out in general terms in the Introduction. The Article then considers
dominant representations of children’s citizenship as a prelude to an analysis
of the constituent components of substantive citizenship from the perspective
of children and a discussion of the relevance of the feminist theorization
of citizenship in this context. The Conclusion argues for the recognition
of children’s citizenship practices as part of a dialectical conceptualization
of citizenship, which embraces but goes beyond the notion of a bundle of
rights.
In the introduction to their Handbook of Citizenship Studies, Isin and
Turner state that contemporary citizenship theory constructs citizenship not
simply in terms of legal rights but "as a social process through which
individuals and social groups engage in claiming, expanding or losing
rights." This, they observe, has led "to a sociologically informed definition
of citizenship in which the emphasis is less on legal rules and more
on norms, practices, meanings, and identities."1 In a similar vein, from
a feminist perspective, Werbner and Yuval-Davis argue that citizenship is
no longer understood simply in terms of "the formal relationship between
an individual and the state" but "as a more total relationship, inflected by
identity, social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices and
a sense of belonging."2 Part of that total relationship is the relationship
between individual citizens, something that has been more prominent
in the Scandinavian literature hitherto.3 It also involves responsibilities
towards the wider community, an element of citizenship emphasized in more
communitarian approaches and by politicians in a number of welfare states
today.
These broader conceptualizations of citizenship lend themselves to the
1 Engin F. Isin & Bryan Turner, Citizenship Studies: An Introduction, in HANDBOOK
OF CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 1, 4 (Engin F. Isin & Bryan Turner eds., 2002).
2 Pnina Werbner & Nira Yuval-Davis, Introduction: Women and the New Discourse
of Citizenship, in WOMEN, CITIZENSHIP AND DIFFERENCE 1, 4 (Nira Yuval-Davis &
Pnina Werbner eds., 1999).
3 See, e.g., HELGA HERNES, WELFARE STATE AND WOMAN POWER (1987); RUTH
LISTER ET AL., GENDERING CITIZENSHIP IN WESTERN EUROPE (2007).
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idea of "lived citizenship": "the meaning that citizenship actually has in
people’s lives and the ways in which people’s social and cultural backgrounds
and material circumstances affect their lives as citizens."4 The significance
of rights-talk to lived citizenship is likely to vary according to political and
cultural context, between groups and over time. The kind of dynamic, process-
oriented, understanding of rights, referred to by Isin and Taylor, is more likely
to be salient in societies where rights are under-developed or are under threat
or for groups who are denied full citizenship rights. A study of civil society
activists in Brazil, for instance, found that although the majority "did not
consider themselves to be treated as citizens, they did consider themselves
to be citizens, primarily because they struggled for their rights."5 In contrast,
a study of young people’s citizenship in the UK found that very few of them
thought of citizenship in terms of rights.6
A dynamic construction of rights, not only in terms of legal status but also
as shaped through struggle,7 helps to open up the conversation between
citizenship as a legal status and citizenship as a socio-political practice.
Key here is the notion of human agency, which provides the link between
conceptions of citizenship as an active, participatory practice and as a set of
rights, which are the object of struggle. Citizenship as a practice represents
an expression of human agency; citizenship as rights enables people to act as
agents.8
Both analytically and politically, this dialectical understanding of
citizenship is more fruitful than a focus on legal status alone. The rest
of this Article will develop this argument from the perspective of children,
a group that is increasingly calling for recognition as participating citizens
yet whose status as citizens is not straightforward. Children who hold the
legal status of citizens of their country of residence by virtue of birth are,
for instance, entitled to one right symbolic of citizenship — the passport
— but not to another — the vote. In contrast to many other contributions
to this volume, which are concerned with citizenship’s external boundaries,
designed to exclude certain "outsiders" permanently, the focus here is on an
4 TOM HALL & HOWARD WILLIAMSON, CITIZENSHIP AND COMMUNITY 2 (1999).
5 Evalina Dagnino, ‘We All Have Rights, but . . . ’ Contesting Concepts of Citizenship
in Brazil, in INCLUSIVE CITIZENSHIP 149, 156 (Naila Kabeer ed., 2005).
6 Ruth Lister et al., Young People Talk About Citizenship: Empirical Perspectives on
Theoretical and Political Debates, 7 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 235 (2003).
7 Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, Towards an Actor-Oriented Perspective on Human
Rights, in INCLUSIVE CITIZENSHIP, supra note 5, at 31.
8 RUTH LISTER, CITIZENSHIP: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES (2d ed. 2003); see also BIRTE
SIIM, GENDER AND CITIZENSHIP (2000).
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aspect of citizenship’s internal boundaries, through which all are expected
to pass in time.9 The temporal reference is of particular significance because it
points to a distinction between the entrenched exclusions faced by "outsiders"
and second-class "insiders" on the one hand and the temporal restrictions on
citizenship faced by children on the other.
I. REPRESENTATIONS OF CHILDREN’S CITIZENSHIP
Before analyzing the implications of these temporal restrictions, how is the
question of children’s citizenship represented in the existing literature? What
follows is possibly something of a caricature, but the two extremes I will
pose should help to identify dominant tendencies in writings about children
and citizenship. On the one hand is the citizenship literature. This has only
recently and very patchily started to address what citizenship means for
children in the here and now. More typically, it has hitherto either tended to
ignore children altogether, implicitly equating citizenship with adulthood, or
has portrayed children as citizens of the future: variously described critically
as "citizens-in-waiting,"10 "learner citizens,"11 or "apprentice citizens."12
T.H. Marshall, author of the classic post-war treatise on citizenship,
referred to children and young people as "citizens in the making."13 In a
chapter based on a study of young people’s transitions to citizenship, I used
this term.14 In a postscript to the chapter, Tom Burke, a 19-year-old student,
criticized it as "fundamentally flawed." He argued that
it perpetuates a passive view of young people who are idly waiting for
citizenship, and if they are lucky, it will be bestowed upon them by
9 Where the two overlap is in the case of the children of non-citizen residents whose
rights are contingent upon those of their parents. See Adriana Kemp, Managing
Migration, Reprioritizing National Citizenship: Undocumented Labor Migrants’
Children and Policy Reforms in Israel, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 663 (2007).
10 DAVID CUTLER & ROGER FROST, TAKING THE INITIATIVE: PROMOTING YOUNG
PEOPLE’S INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING IN THE UK 8 (2001).
11 Madeleine Arnot & Jo-Anne Dillabough, Introduction to CHALLENGING DEMOCRACY
1, 12 (Madeleine Arnot & Jo-Anne Dillabough eds., 2000).
12 Michael Wyness et al., Childhood, Politics and Ambiguity: Towards an Agenda for
Children’s Political Inclusion, 38 SOCIOLOGY 81, 82 (2004).
13 T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 25 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1st
ed. 1950).
14 Ruth Lister et al., Young People and Citizenship, in YOUTH POLICY AND SOCIAL
INCLUSION 33 (Monica Barry ed., 2005).
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others. It does not give young people their true credit as social actors
in their own right nor does it recognise the contribution that young
people are making to our society today . . . I am not a citizen in the
making. I am a citizen today.15
While I would question whether the notion of "citizens in the making"
necessarily carries all those connotations, the criticism does point to the
dangers of future-oriented constructions of children and young people’s
citizenship. These are now quite dominant politically, particularly in the
"social investment states" of the UK and Canada and in European Union
discourse where children are typically constructed in instrumentalist terms
as profitable investments who represent "citizen-workers of the future."16
At the other extreme, there is one strand in the childhood literature which
challenges such future constructions by simply asserting that children are
citizens. So, for example, a report from the UK Carnegie Young People
Initiative, which covers children and young people aged ten and above,
claims "they are citizens and should be treated as such."17 Of course, there
is a wide space between these two extremes, which increasingly is being
addressed by some of the literature, particularly the childhood literature but
also more recently some of the citizenship literature.18
The childhood literature is important also because our understanding
of children’s relationship to citizenship is rooted in how we see children.
The contemporary sociology of childhood’s construction of children as
social actors with agency and varying degrees of competence opens up
possibilities for the recognition of children as active citizens in a way that
a construction of them as passive objects of adult policies and practices
did not.19 "Beings" are more easily seen as active citizens in the here and now
15 Tom Burke, Postscript on Citizenship, in YOUTH POLICY AND SOCIAL INCLUSION,
supra note 14, at 51, 53.
16 Typically, in "social investment states" the prioritization of policies such as early-
years education and childcare are described as investments in society’s future. See,
e.g., Ruth Lister, Investing in the Citizen-Workers of the Future, 37 SOC. POL’Y &
ADMIN. 427 (2003); SANDY RUXTON, WHAT ABOUT US? CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION (2005).
17 CUTLER & FROST, supra note 10, at 2.
18 This includes a number of articles in the key journal in the field, Citizenship Studies,
all of which are referred to in this Article, infra notes 22, 29, 64.
19 STUDIES IN MODERN CHILDHOOD (Jens Qvortrup ed., 2005).
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than are "becomings," whose citizenship is seen as a potential and a status to
be achieved in the future.20
Children are also at times presented as a single category, particularly
by politicians: "because the figure of the child is unified, homogeneous,
undifferentiated, there is little talk about race, ethnicity, gender, class and
disability. Children become a single, essentialized category."21 Yet, just as
adults’ relationship to citizenship is mediated by social divisions, such as
class, gender, race, and disability, so is that of children. Children living in
poverty face particular obstacles to citizenship. As with adults, this calls for a
"difference-centered" theorization of citizenship.22 Although this Article only
addresses difference from the perspective of age, the next step would be a
more differentiated analysis of children’s citizenship.
Age is especially significant for children’s citizenship — not only because
it serves to define the category but also because of its relationship to capacity
within the category "children." Roche points to the distinction, drawn in
much of the contemporary childhood literature, between "the younger child
and the young person." "The arguments for the increased participation
of children in decision-making affecting their lives are both practically
and theoretically more compelling the older the child is," he concludes.23
However, the case is now also being made for the participation of younger
children.24
A UNICEF report on The Evolving Capacities of the Child provides
a compass to help navigate the difficult question of age and capacity. It
points out that, while capacities evolve with age, in practice the actual
ages at which a child acquires competencies vary according to her life
experiences and social and cultural environment on the one hand, and the
nature of the competencies and the situations in which they are required
to be exercised on the other. At every stage, the report argues, there must
be regard for "children’s right to respect for their capacities"25 and for
children’s agency. In practice, "adults consistently underestimate children’s
20 BARBARA FAWCETT ET AL., CONTEMPORARY CHILD CARE POLICY AND PRACTICE
(2005).
21 Alexandra Dobrowolsky, Rhetoric Versus Reality: The Figure of the Child and New
Labour’s Strategic ‘Social Investment State,’ 67 STUD. POL. ECON. 43 (2002).
22 Mehmoona Moosa-Mitha, A Difference-Centred Alternative to Theorization of
Children’s Citizenship Rights, 9 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 369 (2005).
23 Jeremy Roche, Children: Rights, Participation and Citizenship, 6 CHILDHOOD 475,
483 (1999).
24 See infra Part III.
25 GERISON LANSDOWN, UNICEF, THE EVOLVING CAPACITIES OF THE CHILD 15 (2005).
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capacities,"26 raising questions about their ability to assess them.27 The specific
question of citizenship capacity will be discussed below.
II. UNPACKING CHILDREN’S CITIZENSHIP
Having considered children’s relationship to citizenship in very general
terms, the Article now turns to a question posed by Hill and Tisdall:
"whether the concepts of ‘childhood’ and ‘citizenship’ are compatible. This
question," they point out, "depends just as much on how ‘citizenship’
is defined as it does on childhood’s definition. Certainly, a definition of
‘citizenship’ could be made that would definitely include children . . . .
But would such a definition of ‘citizenship’ retain the basic building blocks
of the concept?"28 This Part unpacks these basic building blocks: membership,
rights, responsibilities and equality of status. As Cohen points out, there
is a tendency in accounts of children’s citizenship to treat one element of
citizenship as if it were the whole, yet in its substantive form, citizenship is
not a unitary, either/or phenomenon.29 It may be that some of the "building
blocks" of citizenship are more compatible with childhood than others. In
particular, simply to analyze children’s citizenship from the perspective of
rights, important as they are, would be to paint a very incomplete picture and
one which fails to capture children’s practices as citizens and the dialectic
between those practices and their citizenship status.
A. Membership
On one level, children’s claim to citizenship lies in their membership of the
citizenship community. As explained earlier, this Article is concerned only
with those children who have legal citizenship status in their country of
residence. Their relationship to the citizenship community may be different
from that of adults — in some ways weaker, particularly with regard
to the national citizenship community, in some ways possibly stronger
(through, for example, participation in the school community) and probably
more localized. This does not, however, necessarily affect the claim to
26 Id. at 30-31.
27 E. Kay M. Tisdall et al., Listening to the Views of Children?, 24 J. SOC. WELFARE
& FAM. L. 385 (2003).
28 MALCOLM HILL & KAY TISDALL, CHILDREN AND SOCIETY 38 (1997).
29 Elizabeth F. Cohen, Neither Seen nor Heard: Children’s Citizenship in Contemporary
Democracies, 9 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 221 (2005).
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membership. Membership is, in part, about a sense of belonging. In the
British study of young people’s transitions to citizenship, among those who
understood citizenship in terms of membership some referred specifically to
"a sense of belonging."30 This has been described as a "relational" definition
of citizenship, found by one study to be more prevalent in the UK than the
U.S., where the citizen was more likely to be defined in "non-relational" terms
as the bearer of rights and duties.31 A relational understanding of citizenship
may be particularly meaningful for children, especially in the context of the
local community and institutions such as schools.
Much of the contemporary citizenship literature is preoccupied with the
implications of citizenship for identity. Conover et al., for instance, describe
citizenship as constituting "a fundamental identity that helps situate the
individual in society."32 Hall et al. observe that "in the contemporary political
and policy arena [in the UK], much of the rhetoric of citizenship is about
citizenship as an identity — encouraging young people in particular to think
about themselves as citizens."33 The study of young people’s transitions to
citizenship found that identification with citizenship reflected a number of
factors, including not just age but also social class, experience of paid work
and community involvement, and more subjective factors such as feeling
that one had been treated respectfully and had been able to have an effective
say.34 This suggests that, while it is unlikely that citizenship will be a primary
element in children’s emergent fluid identities, it is more likely to be salient
where they have experience of being treated respectfully as citizens and have
had the opportunity to participate.
In an essay on children’s citizenship, Jessica Kulynych draws on the
work of Ju¨rgen Habermas to argue that "the crucial axis of children’s
citizenship in the contemporary world is membership in the common political
culture, and the key to children’s citizenship lies in their incorporation
into that political culture."35 For her, what is critical in the debate over
30 Lister et al., supra note 6.
31 Pamela J. Conover, Citizen Identities and Conceptions of the Self, 3 J. POL. PHIL.
133 (1995).
32 Pamela J. Conover et al., The Nature of Citizenship in the United States and Great
Britain, 53 J. POL. 800 (1991). For a theoretical discussion of citizenship and
identity, see ENGIN F. ISIN & PATRICIA K. WOOD, CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY (1999).
33 Tom Hall et al., Conceptualising Citizenship, Young People and the Transition to
Adulthood, 13 J. EDUC. POL’Y 301 (1998).
34 Lister et al., supra note 6.
35 Jessica Kulynych, No Playing in the Public Sphere: Democratic Theory and the
Exclusion of Children, 27 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 231, 232 (2001).
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children’s citizenship is the development of citizenship as a political identity
and "recognition of children as politically relevant beings."36 Citizenship as
membership thus also opens up an understanding of citizenship in relation
to political identity and subjectivity, as developed and expressed through
political participation, broadly defined. Roche equates "being counted as a
member of the community" with participation and proposes that "the demand
that children be included in citizenship is simply a request that children be
seen as members of society too, with a legitimate and valuable voice and
perspective."37 He cites Martha Minow’s observation that "including children
as participants alters their stance in the community, from things or outsiders to
members."38 This points to something of a conundrum: children can make their
claim to be members of the citizen-community through active participation in
it; but in order to be able to participate they first need to be accepted as members
of the citizen-community. Yet that acceptance is, in practice, partly contingent
on children demonstrating their capacity to be participatory citizens.
Evaluations of initiatives that have enabled children and young people to
participate, as well as research into children’s participation in social action
groups, testify to how they "strengthen young people’s sense of belonging
to the community" as well as equipping them with the skills and capacities
required for effective citizenship.39 This suggests that, while on one level,
all children are members of the community and therefore have the status of
citizens in a thin sense, recognition of children as citizens in the thicker sense
of active membership requires facilitating their participation as political and
social actors. This is about more than just participation in individual decisions
about a child’s own life made by parents and professionals. It also means
participation in wider collective decision-making.
Increasingly, mechanisms are being developed throughout the world to
enable such participation, albeit often patchily and with varying degrees of
effectiveness, on the one hand, and tokenism, on the other. Examples
include: children’s parliaments and assemblies, children’s participatory
budget councils, and school councils. In a UNICEF report on children’s
participation, Gerison Lansdown cites a number of examples and comments
on the lessons to be learned from them. For instance, she contrasts Children’s
36 Id. at 242.
37 Roche, supra note 23, at 479, 484.
38 Id. at 485.
39 CUTLER & FROST, supra note 10, at 6; GERISON LANSDOWN, PROMOTING CHILDREN’S
PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRATIC DECISION-MAKING (2001); KAREN EDEN & DEBI
ROKER, ‘ . . . DOING SOMETHING’: YOUNG PEOPLE AS SOCIAL ACTORS (2002);
PERPETUA KIRBY ET AL., BUILDING A CULTURE OF PARTICIPATION (2003).
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Parliaments in Slovenia and Zimbabwe. In the former, tokenism was
avoided by "politicians demonstrating that they were willing to listen,
to give consideration to the proposals and issues raised by the children
and act where possible."40 In response, the children developed "their own
sense of democratic responsibility, as they recognised that they were being
taken seriously."41 In the latter, the children themselves identified a range of
factors that inhibited their capacity "to make a significant contribution to the
political agenda" such as the lack of training, clear criteria for selection, and
any follow-up to the parliament.42
Among the arguments that Lansdown delineates for children’s
participation are its contributions to strengthening democracy and to better
decision-making. Support for the latter point can also be found in a collection
of papers reporting on mechanisms in the global North and South, which
demonstrates
the truly significant contributions that young people are able and eager
to make — many of these contributions involve simple, practical
suggestions with benefits not just for children but also for others in
their communities . . . . It is clear from these papers that inclusion,
consultation and the delegation of responsibility to children and youth
can have very practical benefits, and that young people can contribute
a unique and often unexpected and independent perspective.43
However, the editor also cautions against treating "the voice of young people
as a panacea," for "there is plenty of evidence here that simply establishing
participatory structures and opportunities for young people is no guarantee of
their effectiveness."44 A critical factor is whether such structures allow "scope
for meaningful action."45 He suggests that education "in the values and skills
of citizenship" is most likely to be effective if children "can actually use these
skills to make a difference."46 Important too for the experience of citizenship is
40 LANSDOWN, supra note 39, at 19.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Sheridan Bartlett, Good Governance: Making Age a Part of the Equation — An
Introduction, 15 CHILD. YOUTH & ENV’T 1, 9 (2005), http://www.colorado.edu
/journals/cye/.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 10. For a lengthier critical discussion of children’s participatory initiatives, see
also CHILDREN, YOUNG PEOPLE, AND SOCIAL INCLUSION (E. Kay M. Tisdall et al.
eds., 2006); Ruth Lister, From Object to Subject: Including Marginalised Citizens
in Policy-Making, POL’Y & POL. (forthcoming 2007).
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the quality of the relationships involved in participatory initiatives. According
to Neale,
without due recognition and respect, participation may become an
empty exercise, at best a token gesture or, at worst, a manipulative or
exploitative exercise. "Real" citizenship, then, involves a search for
ways to alter the culture of adult practices and attitudes in order to
include children in meaningful ways and to listen and respond to them
effectively.47
This underlines the importance of adults’ behavior and manner of relating
to children. They have the primary responsibility for the development
of participatory structures and cultures that are genuinely inclusive of
children.48 Their own continued responsibilities within the participation
process need to be acknowledged.49
Ben-Arieh and Boyer explicitly equate participation with child citizenship
and assert that its denial is unacceptable from the perspective of children’s
well-being and current and future citizenship.50 They argue that "if children
are denied the right for participation, the onus of blame must lay on the
shoulders of those denying that right."51 Participation thus represents both
a citizenship practice and a (moral) right — at the heart of the dialectics of
citizenship.
B. Rights
For T.H. Marshall, rights (civil, political and especially social) were a pivotal
element of membership of the citizenship community.52 Children’s right to
participation, however, derives from the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child.53 The right to express an opinion and to have that opinion taken into
47 Bren Neale, Introduction: Young Children’s Citizenship, in YOUNG CHILDREN’S
CITIZENSHIP 6, 9 (Bren Neale ed., 2004).
48 See, e.g., Ruth Marchant & Perpetua Kirby, The Participation of Young Children,
in YOUNG CHILDREN’S CITIZENSHIP, supra note 47, at 92.
49 Gerison Lansdown, International Developments in Children’s Participation: Lessons
and Challenges, in CHILDREN, YOUNG PEOPLE AND SOCIAL INCLUSION, supra note
46, at 139.
50 Asher Ben-Arieh & Yifat Boyer, Citizenship and Childhood, 12 CHILDHOOD 33, 51
(2005).
51 Id. at 50.
52 MARSHALL, supra note 13.
53 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M.
1448 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
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account in any matter or procedure affecting the child is enshrined in article 12
of the Convention. The extent to and manner in which this right is translated
into enforceable rights of citizenship varies between countries. In the UK,
such a right is contained in various pieces of children’s legislation. There is
not, though, a wider general right to participation for either children or adults.
Arguably, participatory rights are of particular significance for children and
young people because they cannot express voice through the ballot box. As the
U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child observes, "given that few States
as yet have reduced the voting age below 18, there is all the more reason to
ensure respect for the views of unenfranchised children in Government and
parliament."54
It is the lack of the vote that perhaps raises the biggest question mark over
the status of children’s citizenship. The right to vote in national elections
is what divides denizens (people with a legal and permanent residence
status) from citizens, since denizens, in theory, normally enjoy full social
and civil rights. It could be argued that without the vote a person is not a
full citizen. As against that, in the UK at least, the vote does not seem to
figure very prominently in public understandings of citizenship. Moreover,
given low turnout in recent UK elections, particularly among young people,
participation in informal politics, social action or public decision-making
that affects their lives may constitute a more important signifier of effective
lived citizenship for many people.
That, however, is not a reason for dismissing the issue of children’s right to
the vote. In the UK, the possibility of reducing the voting age from eighteen
to sixteen is increasingly being mooted. The independent Power Inquiry
recently recommended reduction of the voting and candidacy age to sixteen.
Its report comments on "the contrast between the very low involvement of
young people in formal democracy and their very active and serious-minded
involvement in the innovations in participation explored by the Inquiry."55
This indicates the need to include young people "in the political process as
early as is reasonably possible in order to sow the seeds of democracy and
empowerment that will create a basis for engagement later in life."56 Others
have made the case for a much wider extension of the franchise to children.57
The study of transitions to citizenship found that young people themselves
54 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 5 (2003): General
Measures of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N.
Doc. CRC/GC/2003/5 (Nov. 27, 2003), cited in RUXTON, supra note 16, at 132.
55 POWER INQUIRY, POWER TO THE PEOPLE 199 (2006).
56 Id. at 200.
57 See, e.g., STEIN RINGEN, CITIZENS, FAMILIES AND REFORM (1997).
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were pretty evenly divided on the question of the voting age. Some did not
favor lowering it because they believed they lacked the necessary knowledge
to vote responsibly. Those who did want a reduction felt that without it they
were not being listened to or respected and that the vote would help them to
feel that they belonged and that they had a say as "full" or "proper" citizens.58
The rights contained in the U.N. Convention constitute universal human
rights articulated specifically in relation to children. As such, they represent
ethical or moral rights rather than directly legally enforceable rights (unless
incorporated into national law) and are distinguishable from adult citizenship
rights, from many of which children are excluded, in individual nation-states.
Nevertheless, they provide "an important advocacy tool, a weapon to
use in battles to secure recognition."59 As such, they offer a resource for
citizenship, although one which is jeopardized by poverty and marginalizing
social divisions.
Marshall wrote of education as a "genuine social right of citizenship."
However, he argued that "fundamentally it should be regarded, not as the
right of the child to go to school, but as the right of the adult citizen
to have been educated."60 The other main social citizenship right to carry
legally enforceable entitlements is social security. It is a right which children
receive only "by proxy" through their parent(s) and which, in the UK, has
become increasingly age-structured.61 Typically, children acquire different
citizenship rights (civil, political and social) at different ages — before, at
and after the age of majority. This reflects how "age is the key determinant in
the acquisition of formal rights in many societies" even though this inflexible
model "does not reflect children’s actual and differing capacities."62 With
regard to civil rights, Cohen suggests that many of the classical civil rights
are typically "regarded as irrelevant or inappropriate to the circumstances of
childhood."63
Children’s disqualification from adult citizenship rights is justified on
grounds of their need for protection and their dependence on adults. Few
would question that some distinction is valid on those grounds. That does
not mean, though, that current configurations of their rights are necessarily
58 Unpublished data from Economic and Social Research Council Project L134 25
1039 (2002).
59 Michael Freeman, Beyond Rhetoric: Extending Rights to Young People, in YOUTH
POLICY AND SOCIAL INCLUSION, supra note 14, at 55, 66.
60 MARSHALL, supra note 13, at 25.
61 GILL JONES AND CLAIRE WALLACE, YOUTH, FAMILY AND CITIZENSHIP 49 (1992).
62 LANSDOWN, supra note 25, at 49-50.
63 Cohen, supra note 29, at 224.
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logical or appropriate from the point of view of the acquisition of full
citizenship status, particularly in relation to what has been called today’s
"responsibilized" child.64 Interestingly, in the transitions to citizenship study
mentioned earlier, the young people found it much harder to articulate their
rights as citizens than they did their responsibilities.65 This may partly reflect
the British context, in which successive recent governments have promoted
responsibilities and obligations over rights.
C. Responsibilities
There are two overlapping aspects to children’s responsibilities as citizens:
those that are imposed (by law) and/or encouraged by the state, and those
that children exercise of their own accord. As citizenship is increasingly
interpreted as involving responsibilities as well as rights, it is important not
to lose sight of this element when discussing children’s citizenship. Indeed,
the evidence of the responsibilities that many children exercise can be used
in support of their claims for more effective rights.
A key imposed minimal responsibility of citizenship is to obey the law.66 In
the UK, the effective age of criminal responsibility is now only ten in England
and Wales, and eight in Scotland, in defiance of the recommendations of the
U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child.67 Children are a prime target
of anti-social behavior orders and they can now be subject to special "child
curfews."68 However, policy is not consistent. Such and Walker contrast the
responsibilities attributed to children in crime and anti-social behavior policies
with the lack of responsibility accorded them in family policy. They observe
that "it is notable that children appear only to be granted agency and autonomy
in the context of wrong-doing: children are able to be willfully irresponsible
64 Daiva Stasiulis, The Active Child Citizen: Lessons from Canadian Policy and the
Children’s Movement, 6 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 507, 509 (2002).
65 Lister et al., supra note 14.
66 In some countries in the global South, children are used as soldiers. Although
military service was a traditional duty of citizenship, in countries such as the UK
where it simply represents a career choice, this is no longer the case.
67 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee
on the Rights of the Child: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.188 (Oct. 9, 2002).
68 Anti-social behavior orders (or ASBOs) are penalties imposed by civil law in
response to repeated anti-social behavior; failure to comply with their requirements
can lead to a criminal charge including a jail sentence of up to five years. Hitherto,
nearly half have been imposed on children aged under sixteen. They have been the
subject of considerable controversy.
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but not willfully responsible."69 Their article reports on an exploratory study
of children’s own understandings of responsibility in the context of family
life. They conclude that "responsibility is a meaningful and everyday aspect
of many children’s lives. To shy away from recognising this . . . serves to deny
children social citizenship."70
It is possible to point to examples of how children assume responsibility
in both the private and public spheres, undertaking various forms of work,
although this varies according to factors such as cultural and socio-economic
context and gender.71 In the private sphere, an important example highlighted
in the literature is the heavy responsibility taken on by children who assume
the role of young carers.72 In the public sphere, a number of research studies as
well as media reports reveal a fair amount of formal and informal volunteering
and social action among children and young people.73 In many countries in
the global South, children have to take on a range of adult responsibilities in
both private and public spheres, particularly in countries where their families
have been ravaged by HIV-AIDS.
Some children also exercise responsibility as political citizens in both
national and global contexts. A review of children as actors in the
development process gives examples of children’s "political and social
activism, whether on their own behalf, on behalf of their communities,
or other children, or in support of an idea or principle. Children have
acted as defenders of equality and justice . . . [and] as defenders
of nationhood."74 Writing about the international children’s organization,
Free the Children, Stasiulis suggests that the emergent children’s movement
"advances a view of children as empowered, knowledgeable, compassionate
and global citizens."75 She characterizes the children’s movement as enacting
69 Elizabeth Such & Robert Walker, Young Citizens or Policy Objects?, 34 J. SOC.
POL’Y 39, 46 (2005).
70 Id. at 54-55.
71 Pavla Miller, Useful and Priceless Children in Contemporary Welfare States, 12
SOC. POL. 3 (2005); Viviana A. Zelizer, The Priceless Child Revisited, in STUDIES
IN MODERN CHILDHOOD, supra note 19, at 184.
72 Chris Dearden & Saul Becker, Growing Up Caring, in YOUTH POLICY AND SOCIAL
INCLUSION, supra note 14, at 251.
73 See, e.g., Noel Smith et al., Young People as Real Citizens: Towards an Inclusionary
Understanding of Citizenship, 8 J. YOUTH STUD. 425 (2005).
74 JO BOYDEN & DEBORAH LEVISEN, CHILDREN AS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTORS
IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 44 (2000); see also Emma Williams, Small Hands,
Big Voices: Children’s Participation in Policy Change in India, 36 IDS BULL. 82
(2005).
75 Stasiulis, supra note 64, at 507.
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an "imaginary of children’s active citizenship . . . [which] promotes
cosmopolitan democratic values and a sense of responsibility and empathy
among children in the North for the lives of children in the South who have
been devastated by corporate globalization and adult greed."76 Children of
the South have themselves organized across national frontiers, for instance
through the International Movement of Working Children — a solidarity
movement, which has demanded that working children’s voices be heard in
debates about child labor.77 Here children have created their own "popular
spaces" of participation78 or "children’s spaces."79 Kulynych contends that if
actions in such spaces "are recognized as important forms of participation,
then the activities in which children are already engaged can more easily be
appreciated, and children themselves can more easily be visible as political
actors."80
Participation can promote responsibility. An account of a children’s
participatory budget council in Brazil observes that the majority of the
children involved "feel that participating in the project ‘ . . . helps us to
be more responsible not only at school but at home too.’"81 Another study
of this participatory budget council and similar initiatives in Latin America
found that "it became clear to adults that youth is not an impediment to the
assumption of collective responsibilities."82 The author suggests that "the
proven capacity of children to assume responsible roles can do as much as
anything to promote respect for their particular perspective."83
76 Id. at 532.
77 Protagonism, The International Movement of Working Children,
www.workingchild.org/prota2.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).
78 Andrea Cornwall, Introduction: New Democratic Spaces?, 35 IDS BULL. 1, 2
(2004).
79 Peter Moss, From Children’s Services to Children’s Spaces, in CHILDREN, YOUNG
PEOPLE AND SOCIAL INCLUSION, supra note 46, at 179, 186; Malcolm Hill et al.,
Moving the Participation Agenda Forward, 18 CHILD. & SOC’Y 77, 84 (2004).
80 Kulynych, supra note 35, at 263. See also the discussion of participation, supra
Section II.A.
81 Eliana Guerra, Citizenship Knows No Age: Children’s Participation in the
Governance and Municipal Budget of Barra Mansa, Brazil, 15 CHILD. YOUTH
& ENV’T 151, 161 (2005), http://www.colorado.edu/journals/cye/.
82 Yves Cabannes, Children and Young People Build Participatory Democracy
in Latin American Cities, 15 CHILD. YOUTH & ENV’T 185, 206,
http://www.colorado.edu/journals/cye/.
83 Id. at 208.
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D. Equality of Status, Respect and Recognition
To treat others with respect is seen by the British public as a major
responsibility of citizenship.84 It is one that children are as capable of
exercising as anyone else. Conversely, Neale defines citizenship for children
"as an entitlement to recognition, respect and participation."85 Accounts
"from below" identify recognition and respect — both for what humans
hold in common and for their differences — as key elements of inclusive
citizenship.86 Yet, as hinted at above, a common theme in the literature is the
lack of recognition and respect for the responsibilities that children and young
people exercise. This reflects a wider sense that children are not respected and
therefore do not enjoy genuine equality of status as citizens. This is particularly
true of children brought up in poverty, since poverty itself all too often is met
with disrespectful treatment, and the effects on children can be especially
wounding.87
III. LESSONS FROM THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE
As has been argued elsewhere with reference to gender and citizenship, "lack
of recognition implies exclusion and marginalisation from ‘full participation’
in the community."88 The emergent children’s movement can be understood
as a struggle for recognition. This leads to the possible parallels between the
feminist critique and the critiques of children’s relationship to citizenship.
Wintersberger suggests that "gender studies have been a major source of
inspiration and enlightenment for childhood studies," particularly with regard
to women’s movements’ "questioning [of] the stranglehold of patriarchy."89
84 DEVELOPMENT AND STATISTICS DIRECTORATE, HOME OFFICE RESEARCH, 2003
HOME OFFICE CITIZENSHIP SURVEY (2004); Matthew Almond, An Investigation
into the Meanings of Good Citizenship (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Loughborough University) (on file with the Pilkington Library).
85 Neale, supra note 47, at 1.
86 Naila Kabeer, The Search for Inclusive Citizenship, in INCLUSIVE CITIZENSHIP, supra
note 5, at 1.
87 RUTH LISTER, POVERTY (2004); see also TESS RIDGE, CHILDHOOD POVERTY AND
SOCIAL EXCLUSION (2002).
88 Barbara Hobson & Ruth Lister, Citizenship, in CONTESTED CONCEPTS IN GENDER
AND SOCIAL POLITICS 23, 41 (Barbara Hobson et al. eds., 2002).
89 Helmut Wintersberger, Work, Welfare and Generational Order: Towards a Political
Economy of Childhood, in STUDIES IN MODERN CHILDHOOD, supra note 19, at 201,
214.
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Feminist citizenship theory illuminates a number of aspects of children’s
citizenship, although this does not mean that it is possible simply to transpose
the feminist critique without adaptation.
A. Capacity
First, just as feminists have exposed the male template underpinning
traditional meanings of citizenship,90 so can we argue that it is an adult
template which measures children against an adult norm and ignores the
particularities of children’s relationship to citizenship. The difference is that,
today, citizenship’s universalism is supposed to cover women, at least in
theory, whereas mainstream accounts of citizenship do not typically make any
claims to include children.
The reasons used to justify women’s earlier exclusion from citizenship are
very similar to those used to justify children’s exclusion today: notably their
lack of competence, in particular to be rational, and their dependency.91 In
response, both the definition of capacity and dominant assumptions about
children’s lack of it are under challenge. Hill and Tisdall,92 for instance,
question the use of rationality as a criterion, pointing out that adults do
not necessarily always act rationally in decision-making, whatever their
capacities. Alderson states that "competence seems to be as much in the
eye of the beholder as the ability of the child."93 This, she suggests, points to
a need to develop new ways of defining and assessing children’s competence.
According to the UNICEF report, most of the thinking on this has been in
relation to medical consent.94 What is needed is the same kind of assessment
of the capacities necessary for citizenship.
A priori assumptions about age-related citizenship capacity have
increasingly come under challenge. The Carnegie report points to the ability
of children aged three or four "to express views about their immediate
environment" and "to well tested methods . . . to listen to and analyse
these views."95 In their contribution to another UK report, which focuses
on under-12-year-olds and in particular those aged 0-7, Marchant and Kirby
90 LISTER, supra note 8.
91 See Ratna Kapur, The Citizen and the Migrant: Postcolonial Anxieties, Law and the
Politics of Exclusion/Inclusion, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 537 (2007).
92 HILL & TISDALL, supra note 28.
93 Priscilla Alderson, Rights of Children and Young People, in THE WELFARE OF
CITIZENS 153, 175 (Anna Coote ed., 1992).
94 LANSDOWN, supra note 25.
95 CUTLER & FROST, supra note 10, at 80.
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are critical of the way this group is rendered invisible as citizens and of the
assumption that it is only older children who can participate as citizens. They
argue that "young children have different competencies to older children and
adults, but they are not inherently incompetent."96 In her introduction, Neale
points out that the inclusion of older children and young people is relatively
straightforward. They are expected to assume "‘adult’ modes of behaving
and communicating," so that "it requires little change on the part of adults."
"Citizenship for young children, on the other hand," she argues, "requires
some effort on the part of adults to accommodate children’s varied modes of
doing, saying and being."97
While there may nevertheless be a legitimate empirical question
concerning the competence for citizenship of babies and very young
children, the developmental nature of childhood competence is elided
by a dichotomous counterpoising of maturity and competence against
immaturity and incompetence. In this way, Wintersberger argues, "although
sex and age relations are of fundamentally different nature, both gender
and generational relations use dichotomies, which are more open to
discrimination, marginalization and exclusion."98 It is just such dichotomies
that the feminist citizenship literature has challenged.99
As observed earlier, there are countless instances of where children have
shown themselves to be competent in the skills and capacities required for
participation as citizens in different kinds of political spaces — from, for
instance, children’s parliaments to schools. At the same time, as Alderson
has pointed out, "treating children with respect can markedly increase
their competence."100 Moreover, the UNICEF report suggests that "like
adults, children build competence and confidence through direct experience:
Participation leads to greater levels of confidence, which in turn enhances
the quality of participation."101 Participation, also, the report argues, helps to
develop a sense of autonomy and independence. However, as in the feminist
context, this is less likely to be the case where participation is tokenistic.102
96 Ruth Marchant & Perpetua Kirby, The Participation of Young Children:
Communication, Consultation and Involvement, in YOUNG CHILDREN’S
CITIZENSHIP, supra note 47, at 92, 127-28.
97 Neale, supra note 47, at 15.
98 Wintersberger, supra note 89, at 215.
99 LISTER, supra note 8.
100 Alderson, supra note 93, at 175.
101 LANSDOWN, supra note 25, at 17.
102 See supra Section II.A.
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B. (In)dependence
The treatment in the literature of dependence as an obstacle to children’s
citizenship echoes some of the arguments in the feminist literature. Writing
about young people, Jones and Wallace explicitly draw parallels to argue that
the extended dependence of young people as a result of policy developments
in the UK in the late twentieth century has damaged their status as
citizens. More recently, Jones and Bell claim that "citizenship is meaningless
without economic independence."103 Children in industrialized societies lack
it completely, except for whatever part-time wages they may earn.
As noted, any social security rights for children are by proxy. A key
feminist policy argument has been that women’s right to social security
should be individualized and not mediated through their partner. This is a
more difficult argument to apply to children who, in societies where they
are required to attend school, do not have the potential to earn a wage to
support themselves and are thus necessarily dependent economically upon
parents or other adults who are responsible for their protection.
I am not arguing here that children should be entitled to social security in
their own right, but rather that their lack of entitlement to this key social right
because of their necessary economic dependence on adult protectors should
not be used to devalue their claims to citizenship. As in feminist citizenship
theory, what is at issue here is the status accorded economic independence
through paid work as key to citizenship. Thus, while children’s economic
dependence, derived from their need for protection, may be incompatible
with full rights as social citizens, it does not follow that children lose their
claim to be active, participating citizens. The UNICEF report explains that
one of the most fundamental challenges posed by the Convention on
the Rights of the Child is the need to balance children’s rights to
adequate and appropriate protection with their right to participate in
and take responsibility for the exercise of those decisions and actions
they are competent to take for themselves.104
It points to "the cultural change necessary so that children are protected
appropriately in accordance with their evolving capacities, and also respected
as citizens, as people, and as rights bearers."105
103 GILL JONES & ROBERT BELL, BALANCING ACTS: YOUTH, PARENTING AND PUBLIC
POLICY 60 (2000).
104 LANSDOWN, supra note 25, at 32.
105 Id. at xi.
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As Stasiulis argues, dependency arising from the need for protection is
not incompatible with the right to participation: "A framework of rights that
implies that only fully autonomous people may enjoy participation rights
normalizes individual independence. . . . Indeed, the mutual reinforcement
of protection and participation rights is integral to the model of children’s
citizenship advanced in the children’s movement."106 Her critique of the
normalization of independence chimes with a strand of feminist argument.
Iris Young’s107 distinction between independence as autonomy (the ability
to make and act upon one’s choices) and as self-sufficiency ("not needing
help or support from anyone in meeting one’s needs and carrying out one’s
life plans") is helpful here, for the autonomy associated with citizenship
does not require an illusory self-sufficiency. Moss and Petrie point out that
feminist arguments about human interdependence can be applied to children
as well as adults.108 This claim is supported by Such and Walker’s exploratory
study, which indicated that "crucial components of responsibility were found
to be its interdependence and relational nature."109 In their discussion of
children’s dependence, Moss and Petrie endorse the feminist critique of
"the normative image of the independent wage-earning citizen which is at
heart of contemporary notions of social participation and citizenship."110 The
displacement of that normative image in feminist critiques is thus also relevant
for children in education, whose claim to citizenship cannot, in industrialized
societies, lie through wage-earning, even if some children do earn a part-time
wage.
Furthermore (and this is a subsidiary argument), although children’s
dependence is a product of the care they receive, whereas women’s stems
from the care they provide, as observed earlier some children are also
care-providers. As such, the work involved would be recognized as the
exercise of citizenship responsibility in some feminist frameworks. Children
106 Stasiulis, supra note 64, at 513-14.
107 Iris M. Young, Mothers, Citizenship and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family
Values, 105 ETHICS 535, 548 (1995).
108 Peter Moss & Pat Petrie, Children — Who Do We Think They Are?, in CHILD
WELFARE AND SOCIAL POLICY 85 (Harry Hendrick ed., 2005).
109 Such & Walker, supra note 69, at 48.
110 Moss & Petrie, supra note 108, at 85.
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(especially girls) may also help adult care providers in the home in various
ways, particularly in two-earner and in lone parent families.111
C. The Public-Private Divide and Power
As in the case of women, the link between (in)dependence, care and
children’s citizenship is mediated by the public-private divide. Cohen draws
the analogy between coverture, under which married women forfeited
independent legal status, and the way in which children are "folded into
the legal identity of their parents upon birth."112 So, she argues, "where
women once ceded a public identity to their husbands and retreated (often
reluctantly) to the private realm, children remain privatized by analogous
forces."113 Similarly, in the same way that it was once considered permissible
for men to inflict violence upon their female partners in the private sphere, so,
in the UK, it is still lawful for parents to hit their children, albeit within legal
limits.
Moreover, whereas women are now generally part of the public as well
as the private sphere, commentators in the UK have pointed to how children
are increasingly being excluded from public spaces (or are concentrated in
adult-controlled spaces). In the case of younger children it reflects a growing
protectiveness in the face of risk; in the case of older children, it is disorderly
children who are seen as the risk to the wider community. Kulynych, too,
observes that children "are segregated into their own space . . . [and] are
physically denied a genuine public identity, and an opportunity to participate
as citizens."114 Wyness et al. argue that children are "located within the hidden
private sphere and at best viewed as political animals in potential."115
Even more perhaps than feminist accounts, critiques of the construction
of children’s citizenship are centered on power relationships. Both women’s
and children’s economic dependence are closely linked to unequal power
relations. Women’s and children’s groups are both fighting for more power
as citizens and both have, inevitably, encountered resistance. Hill and Tisdall
suggest that "power is the main differentiating factor between children and
111 See Miller, supra note 71; Such & Walker, supra note 69; Zelizer, supra note 71;
Tess Ridge, Helping Out at Home: Children’s Contributions to Sustaining Work
and Care in Lone Mother Families, in CASH AND CARE 203 (Caroline Glendinning
& Peter A. Kemp eds., 2006).
112 Cohen, supra note 29, at 229.
113 Id.
114 Kulynych, supra note 35, at 254.
115 Wyness et al., supra note 12, at 86.
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adults."116 Some inequality of power is perhaps inevitable in a way that it is not
between adult women and men. Thus, Burke makes clear, in his critique of the
notion of children as "citizens in the making," that he is "not suggesting that
the citizenship young people ‘enjoy’ is the same citizenship that adults have"
for the very reason that "in almost every circumstance young people have less
power than adults and adult-run institutions, such as government."117
D. Equal or Different?
Burke’s observation that young people’s citizenship is not the same as that
of adults brings us to a final parallel between the gendered citizenship
and children’s citizenship literatures: the question as to whether claims to
citizenship are made on the basis of sameness/equality or difference. The
argument for children’s citizenship is predicated in part on a fundamental
sameness and equality as human beings.118 Moreover, to state the obvious,
children become adults, whereas women do not typically become men. Any
arguments based on difference are therefore arguments that pertain only to a
particular stage of the life-course. Nevertheless, these arguments are salient.
Moosa-Mitha asserts children’s "rights to belong as ‘differently equal’
members of society, outside the private/public dichotomy that results
in marginalizing children’s interests and needs."119 She does so within
the framework of a "difference-centred," feminist model of citizenship,
which acknowledges the multiple subject positions occupied by citizens.
Nevertheless, the appeal to equality also represents a claim on citizenship’s
universalist promise. I have suggested elsewhere that we can characterize
such tensions between universalism and difference as a "differentiated
universalism."120 Roche comments that "save for the ‘child liberationists,’
no one is arguing that children are identical to adults or that they should enjoy
exactly the same bundle of civil and political rights as adults."121 Some rights
are shared with adults in the form of human rights, some are particular to
children in the form of children’s rights and some citizenship rights are denied
to children.
The notion of a "differentiated universalism" helps to capture children’s
particular relationship to both citizenship and human rights. It also provides
116 HILL & TISDALL, supra note 28, at 20.
117 Burke, supra note 15, at 52.
118 Ben-Arieh & Boyer, supra note 50.
119 Moosa-Mitha, supra note 22, at 386.
120 LISTER, supra note 8, at 68-92.
121 Roche, supra note 23, at 487.
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a means of acknowledging the responsibilities they exercise and the ways
these may simultaneously reflect both adult responsibilities and their own
position as children.122 Following Roche, no one is arguing that children
should exercise exactly the same bundle of responsibilities as adults — rather,
again redolent of feminist arguments, that the responsibilities they do exercise
should be recognized. Moreover, some advocates of "the imaginary of the
active child citizen"123 acknowledge the dangers of casting participation as a
responsibility for children. The right of the child not to participate must also be
respected. Stasiulis, for instance, asks "does children’s citizenship then tend
to devalue the right of children to remain children with all its implications
— such as playfulness, lightness and ‘childishness’?"124 This is particularly
important in the face of the growing tendency to treat children as adults in
other spheres. Proponents of children’s active citizenship need to be wary
of subordinating children’s right to be children (as understood in particular
cultural contexts) to the higher calling of the demands of citizenship in the
here and now in an instrumental way that mirrors the dominant construction
of children as citizens of the future.
CONCLUSION
Returning to Hill and Tisdall’s question posed at the outset, the conclusion
reached from the above analysis is that we cannot discard "the building
blocks of citizenship" in order to accommodate children. However, feminist
critiques have shown how some of those building blocks can be re-shaped
in order better to do so. A key move is to get away from the construction
of substantive citizenship as an absolute — the idea that a person is either a
citizen or she is not. That has been the purpose of this Article in unpacking
the building blocks and analyzing children’s citizenship in relation to each
one of them. In doing so, it has revealed a second lesson: that the criteria
for inclusion as citizens cannot be uniform and, for the same reason that
they cannot be modeled on male norms, so they cannot be modeled on adult
norms.
Various phrases have been deployed in the literature in an attempt to
122 Sharon Bessell, Children, Human Rights and Social Policy: Is Citizenship the Way
Forward?, Paper Presented at Crawford School of Economics and Government
Seminar Series, The Australian National University (May 9, 2006).
123 Stasiulis, supra note 64, at 507.
124 Id. at 509.
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capture the particular nature of children’s citizenship. Roche125 advocates
Bulmer and Rees’ notion of "partial citizenship"126 as a means of avoiding
either/or thinking. There are problems, though, with the way in which Bulmer
and Rees apply the label of "partial citizenship" to women and people
incapacitated in some way as well as to children. This fails to distinguish
between the elements of partial citizenship that are more or less accepted as
a corollary of a person’s dependent status and those that are challenged as
illegitimate such as in the case of women, minority ethnic groups, gays and
lesbiansanddisabledpeople.Cohenuses the term"semi-citizenship" todenote
children’s "partial citizenship." She describes it as a "middle ground" in which
children "are citizens by certain standards and not by others."127 Although
the term "semi-citizenship" is itself problematic because of its connotations
of inferiority, this characterization as a "middle ground" fits well with the
approach taken in this Article and with the argument that citizenship cannot
be reduced to just a bundle of rights, important as rights are.
I have elsewhere drawn a distinction between being a citizen and acting
as a citizen:
[T]o be a citizen, in the legal and sociological sense, means to enjoy
the rights of citizenship necessary for agency and social and political
participation. To act as a citizen involves fulfilling the full potential
of the status. Those who do not fulfil that potential do not cease to
be citizens; moreover, in practice participation tends to be more of a
continuum than an all or nothing affair and people might participate
more or less at different points in the life-course.128
This formulation does not work for children. Rather, some children are
deploying their agency and acting as citizens without first enjoying the
full rights of citizenship. Again, if we analyze children’s citizenship solely
through the lens of rights, we miss much that is important to their experience
of "lived citizenship" and to their claims to be recognized as citizens.
In fact, much of the literature that is making the case for recognition
of children as citizens is not so much arguing for an extension of adult
rights (and obligations) of citizenship to children but recognition that their
citizenship practice (where it occurs) constitutes them as de facto, even
125 Roche, supra note 23.
126 Martin Bulmer & Anthony M. Rees, Conclusion: Citizenship in the Twenty-First
Century, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY 269 (Martin Bulmer & Anthony M. Rees eds.,
1996).
127 Cohen, supra note 29, at 234.
128 LISTER, supra note 8, at 42.
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if not complete de jure, citizens. It is also calling for adults to transform
their relationship to children particularly in terms of respectful behavior
and changes in the way participatory citizenship is practiced in order to
accommodate children. Finally, it is challenging the idea that it is sufficient
to treat children purely as citizens of the future.
Rights talk, particularly construed in terms of legal status, although
necessary, is not sufficient either for the analysis of children’s citizenship or
for their political claims-making. Indeed, Kulynych goes so far as to argue
that
excessive focus on rights in discussions of children’s citizenship has
actually disabled serious discussion of children as political actors.
Right talk tends to exaggerate children’s current citizenship status,
overemphasizes formal, legal interpretations of political participation,
and obscures the crucial need for recognition in authorizing children’s
citizenship.129
This perhaps overstates the case. Rights do represent a crucial underpinning
to a more participatory and practice-oriented understanding of citizenship.
Nevertheless, a focus on children’s citizenship reinforces the case for a
dialectical conceptualization of citizenship, which goes beyond that of a
bundle of rights. It underlines the value of thinking in terms of "lived
citizenship" as an element of children’s developing identity. It also provides
an answer to the question — "why citizenship?" — from the perspective
of children. With its implications for belonging, identity formation and
participation, citizenship as a rights-bearing status and a practice is "crucial
for the well-being of human beings in general and for children in particular,"
as well as for the wider well-being and flourishing of society.130
129 Kulynych, supra note 35, at 232.
130 Ben-Arieh & Boyer, supra note 50, at 33. It is particularly important for well-being
in the Aristotlean "eudaemonic" sense of "the fulfilment of one’s distinctively human
potentialities" or "self-realization." THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 908
(Ted Honderich ed., 1995).
